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ABSTRACT
My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. 
I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing 
an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the 
movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent 
causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, 
though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of 
agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced 
here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, 
thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action.
ARTICLE HISTORY received 19 february 2016; accepted 18 January 2017
KEYWORDS The problem of action; effort; agent; causal powers; agent causation
1. Introduction
One way to understand the problem of action is to explain the difference 
between those bodily movements that you are making happen during an action 
and those that happen without your making them occur.1 For instance, falling 
down is something that you do when slipping unintentionally. In such unfor-
tunate circumstances, as you are slipping and falling the movements of your 
body are passive insofar as you are not making them occur – they are precisely 
not movements that you are causing. By contrast, walking to the café because 
you want pastry is something that you do intentionally. In situations like this, 
as you are walking to your desired destination the movements of your body 
are active insofar as you are making them happen – they are movements that 
you are causing. Recent philosophical tradition assumes that the key difference 
between such bodily movements resides in their respective causal history: 
the bodily movements that you are making happen while acting are causally 
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initiated and sustained by antecedents of a particular type. Different versions of 
the traditional view specify different types of events as the necessary anteced-
ents, but they all share a common assumption: namely, that the antecedents in 
question are mental events.2 Thus, typical solutions to the problem of action are 
reductive in at least two related ways: first, they explain the causation of your 
bodily movements in terms of the occurrence of the relevant mental events, 
and second, they assume that your action can be explained in terms of causal 
relations among events, rather than in terms of what you are doing.
My primary aim here is to present a new solution to the problem of action. 
The solution that I offer rejects the reductive ambition inherent in traditional 
views. In their place, I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, 
you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and 
controlling the movements of your body, a causal role that is best understood 
as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I propose employs a 
notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of 
free will, as most theories of agent causation are.3 Rather, I intend to show that 
the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you 
are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory 
solution to the problem of action.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I sketch the problem of 
action, the typical solutions to that problem, and two serious objections that 
such solutions face, that of deviant causation and the absent agent. I argue 
that even if the problem of deviant causation was solved, so long as typical 
solutions claim that your bodily movements are caused by your mental events, 
they face a significant problem: if they accept that your bodily movements are 
caused by your mental events, then they must assume that you are identical 
with the relevant mental events. But this assumption, I claim, is implausible on 
metaphysical grounds, so we must conclude that it is not the case that your 
bodily movements are caused by your mental events. I suggest that the under-
lying source of this problem is the account of causation that typical solutions 
assume to be correct, where causation is a relation among discrete events, in 
conjunction with the assumption that the causally relevant events are your 
desires, beliefs, intentions, and other mental events. Because typical solutions 
assume that when you are performing an action your bodily movements are 
caused by your mental events, I claim that they inadequately explain how it is 
that you, a particular persisting physical object,4 are making your body move 
when acting. In Section 3, the irreducible causal role that you play when per-
forming an action is introduced, which I explain in terms of exerting effort, and 
in Section 4, I provide an account of causation that supports the solution to the 
problem of action presented in Section 5. I end by describing that solution and 
noting a few of its salient features.
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2. The problem of action, deviance, and absence
With respect to the overt movements of your body, the problem of action is 
that of accounting for the difference between passivity and activity, that is, the 
difference between those movements that are merely happening and those 
that you are making happen during an action. The standard attempts at solving 
this problem suggest that the difference between such events resides in their 
particular causal ancestry: your overt bodily movement is something that you 
are making happen when it results from and is sustained by the correct type 
of causal antecedent. Although the details vary among them, typical solutions 
assume that the causal antecedent in question is some kind of mental event, 
such as a desire, belief, or intention.5 Thus, insofar as they explain the causa-
tion of such movement not in terms of anything that you are doing but just in 
terms of the causal roles occupied by the relevant mental events, the prevailing 
attempts at solving the problem of action are reductive.
The standard solutions face well-known objections. One serious objection 
is that they cannot solve the problem of deviant causation. The problem is that 
of specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions under which your mental 
events are causing the corresponding movements of your body so that what is 
taking place is an action that you are performing, rather than something that is 
merely happening to your body.6 For example, imagine a scenario in which you 
want to rid yourself of the weight and danger of holding another person on a 
rope, you believe that by loosening your grip on the rope you might achieve 
this result and so you come to intend to do just that, but the occurrence of your 
belief, desire, and intention frighten you so much that they cause you to loosen 
your grip.7 In this case, the occurrence of these mental events causes you to 
loosen your grip and thereby bring about the intended result, but when your 
hands are loosening their grip on the rope this is not something that you are 
making happen – rather, like slipping and falling to the ground, such movement 
is happening in a way that you are not causing, as the causal consequence of 
other events. In order to solve the problem of deviant causation, proponents 
of typical solutions must specify how, exactly, your desires, beliefs, intentions, 
and other mental events are causally related to the corresponding movements 
of your body so that what takes place is an action that you are performing. 
Moreover, they must do so in a way that differentiates situations in which you 
are causing that movement to happen from situations in which the same type 
of movement happens in a manner that you are not causing.
Numerous attempts have been made to specify the right kind of causal rela-
tion, but there is yet no response that is generally accepted as correct.8 For 
present purposes, the upshot of the problem is this: because typical solutions 
assume that causation is a relation between discrete events, the problem of 
deviant causation suggests that there is no way to differentiate between move-
ments of your body that are merely happening and those movements that you 
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are causing while performing an action. For according to typical solutions, in 
both situations the same kind of thing takes place: the movements of your body 
are occurring as the causal consequence of your mental events. In the case of 
deviant causation mentioned above, because the movement of your hands 
results from an intervening mental event of nervousness that you are not caus-
ing, you are not causing that movement to occur, either. But, notice that even in 
cases where deviant causation is absent, the relevant movements of your body 
result from a mental event that you are not causing, so that, here too, even in the 
absence of deviant causation you are not causing the movements of your body. 
Thus, from the perspective of the relevant causal interactions typical solutions 
assume that you occupy the same causal relation to your bodily movements 
while performing an action and while such movements are merely happening: 
in both the movements of your body are happening as a causal consequence 
of your mental events, so in neither case are you causing the movements of 
your body. As a result, without a specification of how your mental events are 
causing the corresponding movements of your body when you are performing 
an action, in contrast to when such movements are merely happening, typical 
solutions to the problem of action fail to explain the very difference they were 
intended to illuminate.
To make matters worse for such solutions, even if the problem of deviant 
causation were solved, a deeper worry remains. So long as such solutions 
assume that your causal role is explained in terms of your mental events, a solu-
tion to the problem of deviant causation does not thereby provide an account 
of how it is that you are causing the relevant movements of your body while 
acting. Given that typical solutions assume that the causally relevant events 
are your mental events, and given that your mental events are not something 
that you are causing, an absence of deviant causation does not ensure that you 
are causing the movements of your body. A similar worry has been expressed 
as an additional and more significant objection to typical solutions, that of the 
absent agent.9 This objection runs as follows: Whenever you are performing 
an overt bodily action, you are making your body move. When you are mak-
ing your body move, you are playing a causal role in initiating, sustaining, and 
controlling the movements of your body. Since the standard solutions to the 
problem of action depict such movement as caused by the occurrence of the 
relevant mental events, the objection is that such solutions fail to ensure that 
you are playing any causal role in producing your own bodily movements when 
acting. Thus, consider the following remarks by David Velleman and Jennifer 
Hornsby, respectively:
In [standard solutions to the problem of action], reasons cause an intention, and 
an intention causes bodily movements, but nobody – that is, no person – does 
anything. Psychological and physiological events take place inside a person, but 
the person serves merely as the arena for these events: he takes no active part.10
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The problem now would seem to be that agency cannot be portrayed in a picture 
containing only psychological states and occurrences and no agent making any 
difference to anything … [U]nless there is an agent who causes whatever it is that 
her action does, questions about action-explanation do not even arise.11
According to Velleman, typical solutions to the problem of action depict your 
relation to the movements of your body as you are performing an action in a 
problematically passive way. You are the arena or location in which the relevant 
mental events take place, and you function like an inactive observer of those 
events, present only insofar as the mental events in question are attributed to 
you as their subject. According to Hornsby, the situation is worse. It is not merely 
that the standard solutions depict you as a passive bystander who merely bears 
witness to your own bodily movements when acting, but you are entirely absent 
from the picture. Since the movements of your body while acting are caused 
by the relevant mental events and not by anything that you are doing to make 
this happen, there is no sense in which you are making your body move, and so 
there is, in fact, no action in view here at all. If Hornsby is correct, at their best, 
typical solutions depict your bodily movements as a mere effect of prior events, 
rather than as an action the bodily movements of which you are making happen.
In light of this objection, defenders of typical solutions have attempted to 
explain your causal role in terms of the occurrence of a special mental event. 
Velleman, for example, claims that your causal role just is the proper functioning 
of a desire to act in accordance with reason.12 Similarly, according to Michael 
Bratman, your causal role is played by a special kind of intention, which he 
describes as a temporally extended higher-order policy that specifies which 
motives you should treat as reasons when deliberating about what to do. 
Crucially, your causal role in the production of your own action consists in the 
proper functioning of this intention.13 Velleman and Bratman provide good 
examples of typical solutions because they are explicitly offering a reductive 
account of your causal role: you are causing your own action in virtue of the 
proper functioning of a special desire or an intention that causes that action to 
take place. For both, a complete explanation of your action need not mention 
you at all, except by way of the fact that your body is moving in a particular 
manner as the causal consequence of the occurrence of mental events to which 
you are subject. Thus, both retain a commitment to the core claim in typical 
solutions to the problem of action, namely, that the relevant causal antecedent 
is a mental event.
Unfortunately, addressing the problem of the absent agent by adding a spe-
cial desire or intention, or any other kind of mental event, does not change the 
underlying fact that such mental events alone are causing the movements of 
your body while acting. Unless proponents of typical solutions claim that you 
are identical with the causally relevant mental events, given the conception of 
causation that they assume to be correct, it follows that you are not playing 
any causal role when initiating, sustaining, and controlling the movements of 
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your body during an action, and so the problem of the absent agent remains 
unaddressed. That is to say, if causation is a relation among discrete events, and if 
your mental events are causing the relevant movements of your body during an 
action, then, in order to ensure that you are playing a causal role when moving 
your body during an action, proponents of typical solutions must claim that you 
are identical with the causally relevant mental events. However, it is implausible 
on metaphysical grounds that you are identical with your mental events, so it 
follows that your mental events are not causing the relevant movements of 
your body during an action. Thus, typical solutions to the problem of action 
are in trouble.
I suggest that the source of this problem is the fact that typical solutions 
assume that causation is a relation between discrete events. Velleman, for 
instance, explicitly assumes that causation is a relation among events. As a result 
of this assumption, he thinks that the only way to account for your causal role 
when moving your body during an action is to assume that your role is occupied 
by your mental events, so that your causal role in producing your bodily move-
ments during an action just is a relation between your mental events and the 
corresponding movements of your body.14 As I argue below (Section 5), because 
typical solutions share this assumption, they fundamentally misconstrue how it 
is that you are making your body move when acting, for they cannot incorporate 
the fact that particular persisting physical objects, rather than events, are capable 
of causing an effect. As a result, such solutions fail to recognize the fact that, as 
a particular persisting physical object, you are doing something when making 
your body move during an action. I will claim that you are making your body 
move by manifesting a causal power that you possess, which I will describe in 
terms of exerting effort. By highlighting the function that exerting effort plays 
during the performance of overt bodily actions, I will argue that your causal role 
in producing your bodily movements when acting cannot be reduced to a causal 
relation between your mental events and the corresponding movements of your 
body, and I will show how recognizing this irreducible causal role provides a 
nonreductive solution to the problem of action.
3. Effort introduced
In this section, by describing the role that exerting effort plays during the perfor-
mance of an overt bodily action, I motivate the claim that when you are moving 
your body while acting, your causal role cannot be accounted for in terms of 
a causal relation between your mental events and the corresponding move-
ments of your body. Although often overlooked in discussions of action-theo-
retic issues, effort is a familiar and widespread feature of daily life.15 Perhaps the 
most striking examples of effort involve bodily actions that demand physical 
strain and endurance, such as giving birth to a child, finishing a marathon, or 
lifting and holding a heavy object in the air. When you are lifting and holding 
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a heavy object in the air, for instance, you are exerting effort in the process 
of moving the relevant limbs and contracting the muscles that you are using 
while doing so. Successfully doing so involves exerting effort in at least three 
ways. First, assuming that you begin lifting the heavy object while it rests on 
the ground, lifting it off the ground requires that you exert effort, however 
minimally. At the outset of any such action, effort is exerted when contracting 
and straining the relevant muscles as you begin to move the object. As with the 
movement of any object located near the surface of the earth, lifting a heavy 
object requires that you overcome the causal effects of those physical forces 
that are impinging upon all objects at all times, and you are doing so, in part, by 
exerting effort. Second, while you are in the midst of lifting the heavy object off 
the ground, your ongoing exertion of effort is sustaining that movement for its 
duration, sometimes while overcoming muscle fatigue or pain. Third, through 
your ongoing exertion of effort you are controlling the ways in which the rel-
evant capacities of your body are remaining in motion, for instance increasing 
or decreasing the pace of the bodily movements that you are performing, or 
varying the intensity or degree of effort that you are exerting in the process. Put 
in slightly more general terms, by exerting effort you are initiating, sustaining, 
and controlling the activity of the relevant bodily capacities as you are lifting 
the heavy object, thereby setting in motion the relevant parts of your body, 
sustaining those bodily movements over time, and controlling the way in which 
they are occurring until the action has come to an end.
As this example aims to show, when you are performing a bodily action such 
as lifting and holding a heavy object in the air, the effort that you are exerting 
while moving the relevant limbs and straining against the weight of that object 
is not a mental state, event, or process, or in any sense mental.16 Exerting effort 
is not like volition, willing, or trying to perform an action, as such notions are 
often understood.17 Brian O’Shaughnessy, for instance, claims that trying is a 
mental action the performance of which causes the relevant movements of 
your body. He thinks that every bodily action that you succeed in performing is 
identical with the simultaneous occurrence of two events: the mental action of 
trying to perform that bodily action, along with the corresponding movements 
of your body, where the former event causes the latter event to take place.18 The 
notion of effort introduced here is importantly different. As the above example 
highlights, the effort that you are exerting when moving your body and over-
coming the weight of the heavy object is distinctly causal, and in the case of such 
overt bodily actions it is distinctly physical, borne out by various parts of your 
body during your performance of the action in question. In addition, although 
your exertion of effort is causally independent of the occurrence of your mental 
events, causal independence does not entail that your mental events play no 
explanatory role with respect to what you are doing.19 Crucially, then, when 
you are exerting effort while moving your body you are causing an action to 
occur as an effect of what you are doing. Equally as important, the exertion 
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of effort is attributed to you, the agent performing the action in question, as 
something that you are doing, rather than to any of your mental events. I return 
to these points below (Section 5), after a brief interlude in which I describe a 
metaphysical framework that supports the alternative solution to the problem 
of action defended here.
4. Manifesting causal powers – an interlude
In this section, I outline the main features of a metaphysical framework that 
supports the alternative solution to the problem of action introduced below. 
The framework itself is not one that I shall defend, as it has been defended at 
length elsewhere.20 Rather, the goal is to apply the framework to the case of 
agents and the actions that they perform and thereby provide a new solution 
to the problem of action, as well as further expose the limitations within typical 
solutions.
The framework stands in contrast with a common way of thinking of the 
metaphysics of causation within philosophy of action, if not more generally. 
That common conception of causation assumes that causation is a relation 
between discrete events. The occurrence of one event, the cause, is followed 
by the occurrence of another event, the effect, and the relation between the 
events is asymmetrical, nonreflexive, transitive, and presupposes a general reg-
ularity or law of nature relating events of that type.21 In contrast, the alternative 
framework does not share the assumption that causation is a relation between 
discrete events, nor that the relation is asymmetrical, nonreflexive, transitive, and 
presupposes a general regularity or law of nature relating events of that type. 
Rather, the guiding idea is that causation is the manifesting of causal power by 
particular persisting objects, rather than a relation between discrete events that 
presupposes a general regularity or law of nature relating events of that type. 
Thus, the alternative framework illuminates the sense in which causation is a sin-
gular process wherein particular objects are manifesting specific causal powers 
and producing effects unique to the conditions at hand. Within this framework, 
events are relevant only insofar as they contain objects manifesting causal pow-
ers. Here, speaking of relations between discrete events is just shorthand for 
speaking of the specific objects that are manifesting causal powers and thereby 
causing the effects in question, so that statements about types of events, general 
regularities, or laws of nature are made true by particular objects manifesting 
causal powers. More precisely, the framework assumes the following:
(a)  There are causal powers.
(b)  Some causal powers are irreducible and intrinsic properties of objects.
(c)  An object can have a causal power even when that power is not 
manifesting.
(d)  Having a causal power enables an object to make something happen.
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(e)  When an object is manifesting a causal power it is causing an effect, a 
process that depends on the causal power and the condition in which 
it is manifesting.
(f )  The manifesting of causal power can be distinct from any effect thereby 
produced.
Several points are worth emphasizing. The manifesting of causal power is not a 
matter of what would happen if particular conditions were to obtain. Rather, by 
manifesting its causal powers an object is causing an effect in the actual circum-
stances at hand. That is, it is the individual persisting object that, by manifesting 
the relevant causal powers, is producing the effect in question.22 The causing of 
the effect is a continuous process that depends on the causal powers involved 
and the conditions in which they are manifesting.
To clarify this framework, consider how it would account for a classic exam-
ple of causation. Suppose that a cue ball is moving across a billiard table and 
collides with a nearby eight ball, which was until that instant at rest, and the 
eight ball accelerates towards the corner pocket and drops in while the cue 
ball slows to a stop. When the moving cue ball comes into contact with the 
stationary eight ball, this initiates the simultaneous reciprocal manifesting of 
the relevant causal powers possessed by each ball. The reciprocal manifesting is 
the change in momentum of each ball upon impact. This ongoing manifesting 
of causal power, however brief, is causing an effect, the eight ball dropping 
into the corner pocket as the cue ball rolls to a stop. The process by which each 
ball undergoes a change of momentum is the continuous and reciprocal man-
ifesting of causal powers possessed by each, and this ongoing manifesting of 
causal power is causing the relevant effect, the resulting change in momentum 
and position of each ball.23 Thus, we have a cause, an effect, and a causing: the 
cause is the moving cue ball coming into contact with the stationary eight ball, 
the effect produced is the change in momentum and position of each ball, and 
this effect is brought about as the result of a causing, namely, the continuous 
and reciprocal manifesting of causal powers possessed by the cue ball and the 
eight ball as they are interacting, however briefly.
Contrast this with the account provided by the commonly held view of causa-
tion as an asymmetrical, nonreflexive, and transitive relation among discrete 
events that presupposes a general regularity or law of nature. The event of 
the moving cue ball’s colliding with the stationary eight ball is followed by the 
event of the eight ball’s accelerating in a particular direction and the cue ball’s 
slowing down while changing direction. Crucially, since this notion of causation 
presupposes a general regularity or law of nature relating events of this type, the 
regularity or law of nature is what renders this particular sequence of discrete 
events an instance of causation. It is only insofar as these events are instances of 
a general regularity or law of nature that the relation between them is genuinely 
causal: the momentum of the particular cue ball and eight ball play no role in 
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making this relation an instance of causation. That is, the individual objects are 
not producing these effects: they are causing no result of any kind.24
The point of this contrast is to emphasize an important advantage that the 
framework of causal powers has over the common conception of the metaphys-
ics of causation. The framework illuminates the sense in which by manifesting 
causal powers particular persisting objects are causing the effects in question, 
and that when an object is manifesting causal powers that object is causing 
the effect in question. In such cases, the events themselves are relevant only 
insofar as they contain objects manifesting causal powers. Speaking of relations 
between discrete events is merely shorthand for speaking of the specific objects 
that are manifesting causal powers and thereby causing the effects in question.25
Of course, many further qualifications would be required to fully defend this 
framework. Here, the point is to highlight the alternative conception of causa-
tion that this framework supports, where causation is a continuous process 
in which the simultaneous manifesting of reciprocal causal powers possessed 
by distinct objects produces an effect, where the effect is the outcome of the 
process in which the manifesting causal powers are interacting. In the case of 
the cue ball striking the eight ball, the ongoing manifesting of each object’s 
reciprocal causal power is a process resulting in the change in momentum and 
position of each billiard ball. Here, we have a cause, an effect, and a causing, 
the continuous and reciprocal manifesting of causal powers possessed by the 
respective objects. In the next section, I apply this conception of causation to 
the case of agents and the actions that they perform, and show how it provides 
an alternative solution to the problem of action.
5. A nonreductive solution to the problem of action
Thus far, I have argued that even if the problem of deviant causation was solved, 
typical reductive solutions nevertheless fail to provide a satisfactory response 
to the problem of the absent agent, for they do not properly account for your 
causal role when you are initiating, sustaining, and controlling the movements 
of your body during an action. In addition, I claimed that the source of this 
failure is the account of causation that typical solutions assume to be correct, 
where causation is a relation among discrete events. Because such solutions 
assume that your role in producing your bodily movements during an action is a 
causal relation between events, they fail to explain how it is that you are making 
your body move when acting. In place of such solutions, I suggest that you are 
making your body move during an action by doing something. In particular, you 
are making your body move by exerting effort. When you are exerting effort, 
you are manifesting a causal power that you possess and which is essential 
to each action that you perform. Your exertion of effort is causally efficacious 
in at least three related ways. When you begin performing any action from a 
fixed position, setting your body in motion requires that you exert effort so as 
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to overcome the effects of those physical forces that are affecting your body 
at all times, thereby making the relevant parts of your body move throughout 
the space nearby. Once in motion, your ongoing exerting of effort sustains that 
movement until the action is complete, sometimes while persevering through 
pain or exhaustion. Moreover, by varying the degree to which you are exert-
ing effort you are controlling the ways that your body is moving, changing its 
direction and pace as needed. For instance, consider how you might lift and 
hold a heavy object in the air for several minutes, without lowering your hands 
and arms or the object. Maintaining that position for several minutes requires 
that you maintain the degree to which you are exerting effort in the process 
of contracting your muscles while keeping the heavy object fixed in place. If 
you continue doing so for some time, as your muscles become weary you must 
counteract the looming physical exhaustion and remain steady. Crucially, you do 
not achieve this result by desiring, believing, intending, or in any sense thinking 
about how to maintain the position of your hands and arms or the heavy object. 
No doubt, your bodily movements might accord with the content of the relevant 
desires, beliefs, intentions, and other mental states, and it might be motivation-
ally effective for you to desire, believe, intend, or otherwise think about keeping 
your hands, arms, and the heavy object in place. However, you do not physically 
endure in doing so through the causal efficacy of your desires, beliefs, intentions, 
or other mental events.26 Rather, it is by continuously exerting effort that you 
are maintaining the position of your body as you persist in holding the heavy 
object off the ground. That is, you succeed in keeping that object in place by 
consistently maintaining, and if necessary increasing, the degree of effort that 
you are exerting while holding the heavy object in the air. In general, when you 
are exerting effort as you are moving your body your action is an effect of what 
you are doing, and your exertion of effort is attributed to you, the agent that 
is acting, rather than to your mental events. Thus, your exertion of effort while 
moving your body is an instance of agent causation.27
How might the alternative conception of causation outlined above illuminate 
this notion of agent causation? As a physical object, you possess a number 
of properties and parts, stand in various relations to other objects, undergo 
change without annihilation, and persist through time while occupying space. 
Your exerting effort is the manifesting of a causal power that you possess as 
an individual persisting object, and the causal power that you are manifesting 
when exerting effort is not a cognitive capacity of any kind.28 When you are 
exerting effort your doing so occurs simultaneously with the manifesting of 
reciprocal causal powers that together produce an effect. In the case of overt 
bodily action, the reciprocal causal powers are the relevant bodily capacities the 
manifesting of which consists in the bodily movements at issue, and the effect 
thereby produced is the action that you are performing. Through your exertion 
of effort in conjunction with the concurrent movements of your body, you are 
causing the action in question to occur as an effect of what you are doing. So 
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long as the relevant conditions remain unchanged, your ongoing exertion of 
effort together with the movement of your body is a continuous manifesting 
of causal powers that are causing the resulting action. Hence, we have a cause, 
an effect, and a causing. Insofar as your causal powers are properties that you 
possess as a physical object, you are the cause; the effect is the action that results 
from your exertion of effort together with the bodily movements in question; 
and together, your exertion of effort and the movements of your body are caus-
ing the action that results from this process. Given this conception of causation, 
the sense in which you, the agent, are playing an irreducible causal role during 
your performance of an action just is the sense in which any physical object is 
playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about the effects that it produces: 
by manifesting the relevant causal powers that you possess as such an object, 
you are causing the effect in question.
Once we have recognized the irreducible causal role that you are playing 
when making your body move during an action, a new solution to the prob-
lem of action readily presents itself. I suggest that the fundamental difference 
between the bodily movements that you are making happen during an action 
and those movements that are merely happening is that the former are occur-
ring in conjunction with your exertion of effort, whereas the latter are not. 
Although the bodily movements you are making happen during an action and 
those that are merely happening might seem to be instances of the same type, 
they are not. The causal contribution of your exertion of effort differentiates 
those movements that you are making happen while acting from those that are 
merely happening, marking the movements as categorically distinct.
There are a number of features of this solution that are worth highlighting. 
To begin, the solution presented here rules out the sort of deviant causation in 
which the relevant events are distinct, where another event intervenes in the 
sequence that causes the correct bodily action, though in a deviant manner. By 
contrast, on the framework of causal powers the required distinction between 
events is gone. For on this framework, your exerting effort occurs simultaneously 
with the movements of your body in such a way that precludes the interference 
of another event in the process causing the relevant bodily action. Here, mis-
takes in performance are possible, but errors of that kind are not instances of 
deviant causation, as in such conditions the requisite action fails to occur. Thus, 
although the solution to the problem of action presented here does not assume 
that exerting effort necessarily succeeds in causing the requisite action, it does 
rule out cases of deviant causation in which an intervening event interferes in 
the process causing the relevant bodily action to take place.29
In addition, when you are exerting effort while moving your body during 
an action, your doing so is not caused by your performance of a prior action. 
That is, there is no other action that you perform as a means of causing your 
exertion of effort while moving your body during an action, and so your doing 
so is causally basic.30 Though your doing so is causally basic, it does not follow 
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that it is uncaused. The alternative solution to the problem of action presented 
here is compatible with the claim that nothing causes your exertion of effort 
while you are moving your body during an action, and with the claim that your 
doing so is causally determined by prior events, conditions, or circumstances. 
Furthermore, your exertion of effort while moving your body during an action 
is not itself an action. Your action is the completed effect of the process by 
which you are causing its occurrence. For instance, in cases of relatively simple 
actions like raising your arm, your exertion of effort occurs at the same time as 
the movement in question, as the simultaneous manifesting of reciprocal causal 
powers that are causing that action. In such cases you are initiating, sustaining, 
and controlling the movement of your arm by exerting effort, however briefly, 
and once your arm has risen and you are no longer in the midst of raising it, you 
have successfully performed a completed action. Thus, your exertion of effort 
is a feature of the process, however brief, by which you are causing the action 
in question, but it is not itself an action.
6. Conclusion
If what has been said here is correct, we now have a new solution to the problem 
of action, one in which the notion of agent causation plays an ineliminable role. 
As we have seen, the problem of action is that of accounting for the difference 
between those movements of your body that are merely happening and those 
that you are making happen while acting, and the typical reductive solutions 
explain the causation of your bodily movement in terms of the occurrence of 
the relevant mental events, rather than in terms of what you are doing. I have 
argued that, even if proponents of such solutions solved the problem of deviant 
causation, they nevertheless fail to provide a satisfactory response to the prob-
lem of the absent agent, for they do not properly account for how it is that you 
are initiating, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body during an 
action. So long as such solutions assume that your bodily movement is caused 
by the relevant mental events, it follows that you are not doing anything when 
making your body move, you are not causing the action that you perform, and 
so there is, arguably, no action in view here at all.
In addition, I have claimed that the source of this failure is the account of 
causation that typical solutions assume to be correct, where causation is a rela-
tion among discrete events. Because such solutions assume that your bodily 
movement is caused by the relevant mental events, they fail to explain how it 
is that you, a particular persisting physical object, are making your body move 
when acting. In place of such reductive solutions, I argued that, once we have 
equipped ourselves with a plausible alternative conception of causation, a new 
solution easily presents itself. According to that solution, the key difference 
between those movements of your body that are merely happening and those 
that you are making happen while acting is the fact that when you are moving 
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your body during an action, you are making your body move by doing something. 
In particular, I suggest that you are making your body move by exerting effort. 
As the simultaneous manifesting of reciprocal causal powers that you possess, 
when you are exerting effort while moving your body you are causing the action 
that results from this process, and you are doing so in a way that is absent 
from situations in which similar bodily movements are merely happening. Thus, 
the notion of agent causation is crucial to solving the problem of action while 
explaining how it is that you are making your body move when causing those 
actions that you perform.
Notes
1.  For an early and influential statement of the problem, see Frankfurt (1978). In 
what follows, the topic will be intentional bodily actions that involve overt bodily 
movements.
2.  The term ‘event’ will be interpreted broadly to include, for instance, mental states, 
properties, and processes.
3.  Historically, this has been the case among defenders of agent causation, but it is 
not a necessary feature of the view. See, for example, Alvarez and Hyman (1998), 
Markosian (1999), Mayr (2011), Nelkin (2011), and Franklin (2016).
4.  In claiming that you are identical with a particular persisting physical object the 
idea is that you are a spatiotemporally continuous living human body rather 
than an event, state, property, process, or other type of entity. The question of 
whether your mental states, events, properties, processes, etc., are non-physical 
is not at issue. Here, what matters is that you are identical with the particular 
spatiotemporally continuous living human body whose movements you are 
causing when acting.
5.  See Bishop (1989), Brand (1984), Bratman (1987), Davidson (1963), Enç (2003), 
Goldman (1970), and Mele (1992), among many others.
6.  See, for instance, Chisholm (1964) and Peacocke (1979).
7.  Davidson (1973) raised a very similar example.
8.  For the claim that no solution is currently deemed correct, see Aguilar (2012), 
O’Brien (2012), and Paul (2011). For recent attempted solutions, see Arpaly and 
Schroeder (2015), Shepherd (2014), and Schlosser (2007). Each is reductive in the 
sense at issue here and subject to the same objections raised in the main text.
9.  See Alvarez and Hyman (1998), Hornsby (2004), Melden (1961), and Pereboom 
(2014).
10.  Velleman (1992, 461, original emphasis).
11.  Hornsby (2004, 8 and 13, emphasis added).
12.  Velleman (1992, 479).
13.  Bratman (2001).
14.  See Velleman (1992, 467, n. 16), where he claims that ‘an agent, as a persisting 
entity, is the wrong sort of thing to cause particular events’ and that ‘the causation 
of events by the right sorts of things – that is, by other events – may in some cases 
amount to, or deserve to be described as, their being caused by the agent himself.’ 
See also Velleman (1992, 476), where he says of the relevant mental event that 
it ‘will be what plays the functional role of the agent and is therefore functionally 
identical to him [or her]’ (italics added), where functional roles are causal roles. 
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As I argue in Section 4, causation need not be assumed to be a relation among 
discrete events, so we need not assume that causation by an agent must be 
reduced to causation by an agent’s mental events.
15.  Philosophers who discuss notions of effort that differ from that introduced 
here include Bradford (2015), Holton (2009), Kane (1996), and Shepherd (2016). 
Otherwise, it is largely absent from explicit consideration.
16.  In fact, a parallel account can be given of the causal role of your exertion of 
effort when performing mental actions. In such cases, the effort exerted will be 
distinctly mental, borne out by the relevant cognitive capacities that are used 
when performing such an action.
17.  For volitionalist theories of action see Hornsby (1980), McCann (1974), and 
O’Shaughnessy (1973).
18.  See, for example, O’Shaughnessy (1973, 374).
19.  For an account of action that is consistent with this claim, see Sehon (2005, 2016). 
I briefly discuss such causal independence again in Section 5.
20.  For defense of similar frameworks, see Bird (2007), Ellis (2001), Harré and Madden 
(1975), Heil (2012), Martin (2008), Molnar (2003), and Mumford and Anjum (2011).
21.  This notion of causation traces back at least to Hume (1739/1975). Lewis (1973) 
and Davidson (1967) more recently defended a similar notion. For useful criticism, 
see Chakravartty (2005), and the texts cited in the previous note.
22.  For an argument that particular objects (or substances) cause the relevant effect, 
see Lowe (2013), Mayr (2011), and Steward (2012). For the claim that only causal 
powers are relevant, see Buckareff (2011) and Mumford and Anjum (2011).
23.  See Huemer and Kovitz (2003) for discussion of a related example.
24.  For discussion of a similar point, see Ellis (2001, chap. 1 and 3).
25.  See Mumford and Anjum (2011, chap. 1) who defend a similar claim about the 
role of events in causation.
26.  Again, for an account of action that is consistent with the claim that your mental 
events are causally independent of your exerting effort and the actions that you 
perform, see Sehon (2005, 2016).
27.  A popular account of acting for a reason (e.g. Davidson [1963]) holds that the 
reason for which you act causes that action to take place. If that were the case, 
the notion of agent causation introduced here might be taken to rule out the 
possibility that you can act for reasons. For such a worry, see Rice (2011) and 
Schlosser (2008). However, there are other plausible accounts of reasons for 
action, and what it is to act for a reason, that do not assume that reasons for action 
are mental events or that the reason for which you act causes that action to take 
place. For the former see Alvarez (2010, 2016), Dancy (2000), and Setiya (2014), 
and for the latter see Barry (2007), Chan (1995), and Korsgaard (2008, chap. 7).
28.  Recall note 17 and the relevant text to which it is appended. In the case of 
bodily actions exerting effort is not a mental event or mental action, and it is 
unlike volition, willing, or trying, as such notions are often understood. A parallel 
account can be given of the causal role of your exertion of effort when performing 
mental actions, where the effort exerted will be distinctly mental, borne out by 
the cognitive capacities that are used when performing such an action.
29.  Note that although the framework of causal powers eliminates the possibility of 
this kind of deviant causation, it does not thereby solve the problem of deviant 
causation. Instead, through rejecting the framework in which causation is a 
relation among discrete events, it rejects the conditions that give rise to this 
version of the problem. I thank an anonymous referee for calling my attention 
to this point.
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30.  For recent defense of a notion of basic activity that exploits a similar thought, 
see Hornsby (2013).
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